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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Use of Electronic Tracking Device.
In United States v Clayborne,' the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered whether evidence found during a warrant search of a clan-
destine amphetamine laboratory was tainted by the warrantless
use of an electronic tracking device or "beeper" ' attached by
Federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents to a drum of
chemicals purchased by one of the defendants.
With permission of the vendor, DEA agents attached the
beeper to a drum of ether ordered by one of the defendants from
a chemical supply house. Thereafter, they observed the defen-
dant's purchase of the chemicals and followed him to his home
where they saw him unload the drum and take it into the house.
Periodically, they monitored the beeper's presence to ensure that
the drum was not moved. Contact with the beeper was lost and
eventually reestablished when its signal was located at a commer-
cial premises where DEA agents noted covered windows and de-
tected the smell of ether. A search warrant was obtained and
executed, and the search produced methamphetamines together
with materials and paraphernalia for their manufacture. The de-
fendants sought to suppress this evidence on the ground that their
fourth amendment rights were violated by the DEA's initial fail-
ure to obtain a warrant for use of the beeper.'
The court commenced its analysis of the question by refer-
ence to the justifiable or reasonable expectation of privacy stan-
dard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States.'
In Katz, F.B.I. agents, acting without a warrant, attached a lis-
584 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1978).
2 "The electronic beeper sends out periodic radio signals which allow its location to
be established and monitored." Id. at 348. The operational aspects of such beepers are
briefly described in United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en
banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976). See also, 29 VAND. L. Rv.
514, 514 n.5 (1976).
584 F.2d at 348.
389 U.S. 347 (1967). The "reasonable expection of privacy" standard was proposed
by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz. Many lower courts have adopted
Justice Harlan's approach and the Supreme Court itself has appeared to endorse it. See,
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) and Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,
368 (1968). A listing of lower federal court decisions adopting this view is found in Peebles,
The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on Katz and
Dogs, 11 GA. L. Rav. 75, 80 n.19 (1976).
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tening device to the outside of a public telephone booth in order
to monitor the suspect's conversations. 5 The Supreme Court held
that such nontrespassory eavesdropping constituted a search and
seizure under the fourth amendment because it "violated the
privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth . ". .. In rejecting the notion of
"constitutionally protected areas,"7 the Court stressed that the
fourth amendment protects people, not places, and that that
which a person exposes to the public may be the subject of fourth
amendment protection, whereas that which he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may enjoy
constitutional protection.'
Many courts have considered the beeper question under
varying fact circumstances, primarily relating to drug investiga-
tions.9 One of the cases cited by the Tenth Circuit was United
States v. Hufford,10 which focused upon the circumstances sur-
rounding the attachment of the device. In Hufford,11 the Ninth
Circuit found that if the installation of the beeper is legal, as
where the beeper is legally placed on the property before it comes
into the suspect's possession, its continuing presence on the prop-
erty does not violate the fourth amendment, even though attach-
ment subsequent to acquisition might have been an unreasonable
search. 2 In a dictum, the Clayborne court rejected this approach,
adopting instead the First Circuit's treatment of the issue in
United States v. Moore." The Tenth Circuit indicated that were
'389 U.S. at 348.
'Id. at 353. The Supreme Court had heretofore limited fourth amendment protection
to those searches which involved an actual trespass and to those seizures which comprised
the taking of material objects. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). This
"trespass doctrine" required the physical intrusion to be in a "constitutionally protected
area," as in a house or office. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1960).
389 U.S. at 351.
Id. at 351-52.
For an exhaustive listing of the beeper cases, see Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy,
and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALu L.J. 1461, 1462 n.5 and 1463-69 [hereinafter cited
as Tracking Katz).
"539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
With consent of a chemical manufacturer, a beeper was installed in a drum of
caffeine prior to its delivery to the defendants. The Ninth Circuit held that the defen-
dant's reasonable expectation of privacy had not been invaded, notwithstanding that the
beeper was employed in a "probing, exploratory quest for evidence." 539 F.2d at 33. See
also, United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976).
"1 Tracking Katz, 86 YAaw L. J. at 1465-66.
"3 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). In Moore, federal
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the point seriously argued, it would hold, as did the First Circuit
in Moore, that the fact that the defendants initially had no rights
in the chemicals was not of significance because they later ob-
tained lawful possession, after which the agents sought to use the
electronic device already in place."
Another line of beeper cases measures the intrusiveness of
the attachment according to the nature of the item to which the
beeper is attached. 5 This mode of analysis was used by the Tenth
Circuit in United States v. Shovea,6 a case where a beeper was
used for purposes of tracking a car to a clandestine drug labora-
tory. The theory of Shovea was that there is a minimal expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile along a public road. 7 This analy-
sis has also been applied with respect to contraband, where courts
have found that the illegality of possession eliminates any reason-
able expectation of privacy.' 8
The Tenth Circuit in Clayborne focused its inquiry on the
nature of the places where the drum containing the beeper was
stored. Citing its Shovea decision and the First Circuit's decision
in Moore, the court approved the warrantless use of the beeper
for monitoring the drum of chemicals while they were being trans-
ported via automobile from the vendor's premises to the defen-
dant's home. 9 However, the court was careful to point to the First
Circuit's holding in Moore that although electronic surveillance
of an automobile may be conducted without a warrant, the same
is not true of a home." The court saw the crucial fact of the
agents installed a beeper in a container of chemicals which had been ordered by the
defendants. When delivery was taken, a second beeper was attached to their van and the
agents followed them, partially by means of the beeper, to a house. The beeper in the
container was subsequently used to monitor the presence of the chemicals in the house
and a search warrant was later obtained. The court held that the evidence derived from
the use of the beeper while the container was in the house had to be suppressed.
"584 F.2d at 349.
Tracking Katz, 86 YAL L. J. at 1466.
, 580 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978).
" The court cited United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1046 (1977) where use of a beeper on a car was approved in connection with an
ongoing kidnap plot.
" United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1976) (cocaine).
' 584 F.2d at 350. For the view that the warrantless installation of a tracking device
on a motor vehicle to trace its movement constitutes a search in violation of the fourth
amendment, see United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by
an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
584 F.2d at 350.
1979
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present case to be that the beeper surveillance evidence within
the home and that within thb laboratory did not come together
as a single connected transaction, inasmuch as the agents lost
contact with the device following its movement from the house,
and contact was reestablished only after an independent search
by airplane picked up the beeper signal at the laboratory.2' Seem-
ingly, then, if the movement of the drum of ether had been traced
directly from the house to the laboratory, the Tenth Circuit would
have suppressed the evidence on the basis that the warrantless
presence of the beeper within the defendant's home violated his
reasonable expectation of privacy pursuant to Katz.
The court had to resolve one final issue before deciding that
under the circumstances presented, the evidence in the labora-
tory had not been obtained by means of an illegal search. It
phrased that issue as follows: "Given the proposition that the
home cannot be invaded without a warrant, does it follow that a
clandestine laboratory in which amphetamines are likely to be
manufactured enjoys the same protection?"22 The court resolved
this issue by examining the defendant's expectation of privacy
with respect to a commercial building such as the building where
the laboratory was located. It found that strict privacy as in a
home was not to be properly expected in this type of setting,
differentiating the case from Katz on the basis of a comparison
of the size and extent of the intrusion. It concluded:
We consider the electronic beeper as a substitute for persistent ex-
tensive visual effort. We do not say that the laboratory stands on the
identical footing as the automobile, and clearly it is not the same
as (defendant's] home, which the Fourth Amendment protects
from invasion. We are persuaded by the fact that the intrusion of
the clandestine laboratory was slight. Also, it is not to be argued
that defendant-appellant had a justifiable or reasonable expectation
that there would not be any disturbance of privacy. Also, the use of
the beeper within the laboratory was vastly different from the use
of the recording device in the telephone booth in Katz. The invasion
in Katz was of great magnitude in comparison with the intrusion
here. =
Accordingly, the court held that the warrantless use of the beeper
was not invalid under the fourth amendment."
11 Id. at 349-50.
n Id. at 350.
2 Id. at 351.
2Id.
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B. Use of Canine to Detect Illegal Drugs.
Another case in which the Tenth Circuit applied the princi-
ples of Katz" was United States v. Venema,2 where the court
held that the warrantless use by the police of a cannabis sniffing
canine did not violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights.,,
Venema was under surveillance by local New Mexico drug
agents because of his association with a person previously con-
victed of possession of marijuana. Venema was observed entering
a locker at a storage company and returning with a box which
appeared to be much heavier than when he had carried it into the
locker. The following day, the agents returned to the storage com-
pany with Chane, a dog trained and certified to detect the pres-
ence of either marijuana or heroin, and, with permission of the
owner of the storage company, Chane "worked" the side of the
building where Venema's locker was located. On three occasions
Chane "alerted" in front of Venema's locker,8 indicating to the
dog's handler that the locker contained either marijuana or her-
oin, or that such substances had very recently been in the locker.,
On the basis of Chane's reaction, a state district court judge
issued warrants authorizing search of the defendant's locker,
truck, and residence, where quantities of marijuana, hashish, and
LSD were found. The defendant was convicted on charges relat-
ing to possession of the drugs with intent to distribute. On appeal,
he contended that use of Chane to "sniff out" his locker consti-
tuted a search and was not based on probable cause. He argued
that inasmuch as the ensuing searches of his locker, truck, and
home were fruits of the poisonous tree, they should have been
suppressed at his trial.3
The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments, finding that the
defendant had no justifiable expectation of privacy in the area-
way in front of his locker which was semi-public in nature.3' This
finding was buttressed by testimony that when the defendant
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
563 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1004.
The dog's handler testified that the dog "alerts" by changing direction and pawing
whenever he smells either marijuana or heroin. Id. at 1004-05.
11 Id. at 1005.
30 Id.
11 Id. at 1005-06.
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initally rented the locker he was warned by the manager of the
storage company that from time to time she permitted the police
on the premises for purposes of using dogs to sniff out marijuana
and that should he store marijuana in his locker, he did so at his
own risk.32
Even absent these special circumstances, it is likely the court
would have reached the same conclusion, for it went on to note
several cases in which other circuits and an Arizona state court
have held that the use of marijuana-sniffing dogs was not an
unreasonable search violative of the fourth amendment.3 How-
ever, with exception of the Quatsling state court case, the Tenth
Circuit failed to analyze the underlying rationale of these cases,
thus refusing to grapple with some of the difficult issues pre-
sented by the use of canines to detect the presence of illegal
drugs.3 In addition, the precedential value of United States v.
Fulero,35 one of the cases relied upon by the court, is limited
because the District of Columbia Circuit provided no discussion
I d. at 1006.
3 United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976) (use of dogs to sniff air outside
a semi-trailer parked at the rear of a filling station was not an "unreasonable" search);
United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976)
(sniffing, nipping and biting by a "canine cannabis connoisseur" at a suitcase in the
baggage area of an airport terminal did not constitute a search or seizure); United States
v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (canine allowed to sniff the air around a footlocker
in a bus depot); and State v. Quataling, 24 Ariz. App. 105, 536 P.2d 226 (1975) (dog trained
to detect explosives "reacted" in front of defendant's storage locker; subsequent search of
the locker was not violative of the locker renter's constitutional rights).
31 As an example, the court cited without discussion United States v. Bronstein, 521
F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), as authority for the proposition that use of a marijuanasniffing
dog does not constitute a search. An analysis of Bronstein reveals that the Second Circuit
there relied upon the "plain smell" doctrine, which is an extension of the "plain view"
doctrine. The central concept of that doctrine is that if an officer sees evidence or contra-
band while in a place where he has a right to be, he has not conducted a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
The Bronstein court reasoned that because the marijuana was within the dog's "plain
smell," the defendant's fourth amendment rights were not violated. 521 F.2d at 461.
However, as pointed out by one commentator, the Second Circuit cited no case law to
support this view. The commentator further notes that "the major conceptual problem
with this conclusion is that the officers themselves could not have detected the odor of
the marijuana," and that when analagous detection aids, such as magnometers and x-ray
machines, are used by police officers, they are held to be a search and must therefore be
reasonable in order to satisfy the fourth amendment. Search and Seizure-Marijuana
Sniffing Dogs, 42 Mo. L. Rzv. 331, 332 (1977) (citing United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d
942, 946 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972)).
" 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See note 33 supra.
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or citation of authority for its flat rejection of the defendant's
contention that the use of a marijuana-sniffing dog was a search
in violation of the fourth amendment.
One commentator has cautioned that if the use of a
marijuana-sniffing canine is not a search within the fourth
amendment, then under the "plain smell" doctrine" law enforce-
ment agencies may use the dog's sense of smell indiscriminately
without any fourth amendment limitations as to reasonableness,
so long as the officer is in a place where he has a right to be.37
Another commentator, recognizing the danger in placing the un-
invited canine nose outside the protection of the fourth amend-
ment, has suggested that the courts have adopted a methodology
similar to that enunciated by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio,3' which would recognize that the government engages in
activity subject to the fourth amendment's proscriptions when it
utilizes dogs to detect contraband, but that this usage does not
necessarily constitute a full search.3' Professor Peebles continues:
"The reasonableness of such a subsearch would be gauged by a
balancing process in which the primary considerations would be
the individual's expectations of privacy on the one hand and both
the degree of the intrusion and the circumstances occasioning
that intrusion on the other."' 4 Use of this approach, Professor
Peebles believes, would result in more effective judicial control
over surreptitious, sense-enhancing police investigative tech-
niques such as the uninvited canine nose than the formula man-
dated by Katz."
One can only hope that the Tenth Circuit will at least con-
sider this approach in deciding future cases where the defendant
possesses a more justifiable expectation of privacy than was pres-
ent under the facts of this case.
C. Search and Seizure Within a Prison.
In United States v. Ready," the Tenth Circuit considered the
See note 34 supra.
Search and Seizure- Marijuana Sniffing Dogs, 42 Mo. L. REv. 331, 334 (1977).
3' 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
31' Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on
Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. Rav. 75, 94 (1976).
I d. at 95.
"Id. at 103-04.
" 574 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1978).
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applicability of the fourth amendment to a prison search.
It appears from the court's recital of the facts that the defen-
dant Ready had been imprisoned following his conviction for in-
come tax fraud and was interned at the Leavenworth Peniten-
tiary honor camp. Shortly before the indictment with respect to
the charges forming the subject matter of the present case, the
security supervisor of the prison directed that Ready be moved
from the honor camp to the prison. During the customary inven-
tory of Ready's property at the honor camp prior to his transfer,
various items of correspondence were taken to the security super-
visor based on his earlier instructions. He and another prison
official searched through the property and found certain tax
forms filed by Ready and a notebook containing references to tax
matters which were subsequently turned over to Internal Revenue
Service agents. This material was entered into evidence at
Ready's trial, and he was convicted on eight counts of income tax
fraud. On appeal, he contended that the warrantless search and
seizure of papers in his honor camp room at the time of his trans-
fer to the main penitentiary was in violation of his fourth amend-
ment rights and that the papers should have been suppressed.
3
The Tenth Circuit briefly reviewed the few cases dealing with
the issue of a prisoner's right to privacy and fourth amendment
protection while incarcerated. It pointed out that despite the
Supreme Court's dicta in Lanza v. New York" to the effect that
the claim of fourth amendment protection while one is in a public
jail is "at best a novel argument," the Court has since held that
prisoners do not give up all constitutional rights while in prison."
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit noted that Mr. Justice Stevens,
while a circuit judge, had invoked the fourth amendment, holding
that a prisoner enjoys its protection "at least to some minimal
extent," to support, along with due process grounds, relief for a
prisoner who had a trial transcript taken from his cell in a war-
rantless shakedown search." On the other hand, the court pointed
13 Id. at 1011-13.
370 U.S. 139, 143 (1961).
" Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975). See also, United States v.
Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 806 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975) (sufficient showing
of justifiable purpose required); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974) (some justifiable purpose of imprisonment or
prison security must be demonstrated); Inmates of Milwaukee Co. Jail v. Peterson, 353
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to its own recent decision permitting rectal searches of prisoners
under sanitary and nonhumiliating conditions as "a necessary
and reasonable concomitance of appellants' imprisonment",7 and
the Ninth Circuit's per curiam opinion holding that it is not
reasonable for a prisoner to consider his cell private, and therefore
a cell search did not violate the fourth amendment. 8
The Tenth Circuit then disposed of the defendant's fourth
amendment claims in two short paragraphs, the first of which
stated:
Certainly in a federal prison the authorities must be able to search
the prisoners' cells without notice and at any time, for concealed
weapons and contraband which threatens the security or legitimate
purposes of the institution. This is done routinely at Leavenworth
when a prisoner is transferred from the honor camp outside the
walls, back inside, for obvious reasons."
Of course there are many legitimate governmental security inter-
ests that may restrict prisoners' fourth amendment rights, but it
appears that the Tenth Circuit has in this case "merely intoned
the phrase 'prison security' as the basis of its holding without any
further examination." ° The court at the very least could have
inquired into the "security" justification for a detailed, content-
oriented search of the defendant's notebook and tax forms when
a cursory search of such materials would have sufficed to detect
the presence of contraband or weapons. The court, however, dis-
posed of the issue by stating:
It is virtually impossible for the Court to ascertain motives of prison
officials, e.g., here whether the transfer back inside prison was to
impede an escape which the prisoner might attempt if he learned of
the investigation, or whether it was to provide an excuse to look
through his papers. If the search procedure is routine and reasonably
designed to promote the discipline of the institution, we will not
require a search warrant . . . . This situation clearly meets that
test."
F. Supp. 1157, 1168 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (probable cause required).
Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973).
United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
916 (1973).
' 574 F.2d at 1013.
Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures: "Locking" the Fourth Amend-
ment out of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. Rxv. 1045, 1071 (1976). The authors opine
that many courts have taken this somewhat perfunctory approach. Id. at 1071 n.173-74.
" 574 F.2d 1014 (citing Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919)). The court's
reference to the motives of prison officials relates to the motivational analysis applied by
some courts in determining whether the activity of government agents constitutes a search
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Presumably, the facts supported a finding that an intensive ex-
amination of notebooks and documents such as tax forms was
"routine" in these circumstances, but one may wonder how a
content-oriented examination of tax forms bears any rational re-
lationship to the legitimate governmental objective of preserving
discipline in a penal institution."
D. Consent Search.
In United States v. Seely,5 the Tenth Circuit held that a
valid search occurred when police officers, knowing that a search
warrant had been issued and was in transit to the site, searched
the defendant's automobile following his invitation to do so. Spe-
cial circumstances existed which supported the court's finding of
voluntariness of the consent in this case: prior to the search the
police officers advised the defendant of his constitutional rights"
and undertook the search only after consent was renewed follow-
ing the defendant's receipt of legal advice in a telephone consulta-
tion with his attorney." The court also noted that there was no
hint that voluntariness was overcome by threat of a non-available
search warrant."
E. "Misplaced Trust" Exception to Warrant Requirement.
United States v. Oakes" presented the issue whether the pres-
or seizure. Under this approach, only if their purpose is prosecutorial do the actions of
law enforcement officials constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. Conversely, if the objective is not prosecutorial, there is no search. See Giannelli &
Gilligan, Prison Searches and Seizures, 62 VA. L. Rav. 1045, 1052 (1976).
n For a less mechanical model for determining the fourth amendment rights of prison
and jail inmates, see Giannelli & Gilligan, supra note 50, at 1064-77.
570 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1978).
, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973), the Supreme Court adopted a totality of circumstances test to determine
whether consent to search is voluntarily given. Knowledge of the right to refuse the police
request is only one factor of the test and is not dispositive of the voluntariness of the
consent. Id. at 227. The Court thus refused to engraft a Miranda-type warning of the right
not to consent as an additional requirement to the consent exception. See Williams,
Institute on Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement under the Fourth Amendment, 29
OLA. L. Rzv. 659, 672-74 (1976).
0 The defendant was advised by his lawyer that because the only authority for the
search was his consent, he could terminate it at will. 570 F.2d at 323.
" Id. (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)). Inasmuch as the sole
authority for the search was the defendant's voluntary consent, the court was not faced
with the difficult problems presented by searches authorized by issued but undelivered
warrants. See United States v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1971).
'" 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977).
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ence of a Treasury Department agent in the defendant's home,
with consent of the defendant, for purposes of gathering evidence
of illegal possession of firearms was a violation of the fourth
amendment. The Tenth Circuit noted that the defendant had an
arguable fourth amendment claim because the amendment
reaches violations "by guile as well as by force." s The court,
however, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v.
United States" which involved a similar fact situation, held that
the defendant's fourth amendment rights had not been violated
because the agent, although posing as a firearms dealer who was
supplying weapons to domestic political groups, "entered the
house by invitation and took away nothing that was not voluntar-
ily given or sold by appellant."" The court rejected the appel-
lant's attempt to distinguish the facts of the Lewis case from
those at bar, stating that it was immaterial that the agent in
Lewis was specifically invited into the home for the illegal pur-
pose of purchasing marijuana whereas the agent in the instant
case came only to investigate and no firearms changed hands
until the third visit." The court concluded:
We do not believe that the purpose of either the defendant in ex-
tending the invitation, or the agent in accepting it is the critical
factor. The fact is that the agent entered only at the defendant's
invitation and removed only that which was freely offered. "What a
person knowingly exposes to the public even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 2
The Tenth Circuit summarily dismissed the defendant's
claim that his prosecution for illegal possession of an unregistered
machine gun was violative of his second amendment right to bear
Id. at 386 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966)).
" 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
564 F.2d at 386. In Lewis, an undercover narcotics agent was invited into the
defendant's home for the purposes of buying marijuana. The Supreme Court found that
the agent's seizure of the drug did not violate the fourth amendment, stating that the case
"presents no question of the invasion of the privacy of a dwelling; the only statements
repeated were those that were willingly made to the agent and the only things taken were
the packets of marijuana voluntarily transferred to him." 385 U.S. at 212. Other cases in
which the Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches when based on misplaced trust
are: Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963); and On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
" 564 F.2d at 386.
2 Id. at 386-87 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). Ironically,
the Katz Court had cited Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) for this proposition.
1979
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arms.s The court stated that even though the defendant was
technically a member of the Kansas state militia, he had not
demonstrated that the unregistered firearm kept at his home bore
any connection to the militia. 4
F. Probable Cause.
The Tenth Circuit considered an arrest and seizure without
warrant in United States v. McLemore,15 an appeal of convictions
for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation
of federal law." Following receipt by federal agents of a tip from
the operator of the rental agency, the marijuana was seized from
an airplane rented by the defendants. The operator had proved
in the past to be a reliable informant. Further investigation by
the agents prior to the arrest revealed several facts which
strengthened the agents' suspicions that the defendants were
using rented airplanes to pick up and deliver quantities of mari-
juana. 7
At the outset the court noted that unless the search was
incident to a lawful arrest, the large quantity of marijuana taken
from the defendants, which formed the entire foundation for their
conviction, would be inadmissible under the exclusionary rule of
Weeks v. United States." The inquiry thus focused upon whether
the officers had probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest."'
The court used the customary totality of the circumstances
4 "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed." U.S. CoNer. amend. H.
" Citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), the Tenth Circuit stated that
the purpose of the second amendment was to preserve the effectiveness and assure the
continuation of the state militia. 564 F.2d at 387. The defendant was a member of the
Kansas militia by virtue of KArs. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, which provides that the state
militia includes all "able-bodied male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and forty-
five years. . . ." 564 F.2d at 387.
" 573 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1978).
0 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
" 573 F.2d at 1155-57.
"' 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Weeks Court held that evidence secured by federal agents
through an illegal search and seizure was inadmissible in a federal prosecution.
" In Peck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), the Supreme Court said that probable cause
rests upon "whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the] knowledge
[of the police officers] and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was
committing an offense." See also, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949),
where the Supreme Court stated that probable cause relates to the "factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal techni-
cians, act .... "
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test in determining whether the arrest was in fact based on proba-
ble cause.70 It found that although a possible explanation consis-
tent with innocence existed for each separate fact or circumstance
cited by the government as the agents' basis for probable cause,
the "totality of the evidence" in the context reasonably appearing
to the experienced officers supported the lower court's finding
that probable cause existed for the warrantless arrest.7' Hence,
the seized material, which was within the immediate control of
the defendants at the time of their arrest, was properly admitted
into evidence.1
2
Another case in which the existence or absence of probable
cause was crucial to the defendants' fourth amendment claims
was United States v. Rumpf.73 In Rumpf, the majority opinion
reciting the following chain of events in support of its decision
that federal Drug Enforcement Administration agents had proba-
ble cause to believe a felony was being committed which, in view
of the exigent circumstances, justified their warrantless arrest
and search of the defendants: 7 DEA agents learned that a load
of marijuana being flown from Mexico would land on a state
highway south of Grants, New Mexico; the defendants were ob-
served driving into the area in vehicles having prior connection
with marijuana transactions; the vehicles spent the night in the
area and were seen the next morning emerging from the state road
onto the interstate highway; the agents followed the vehicles
eighty to ninety miles to a farm near Moriarty, New Mexico,
observing that the camper trailer pulled by one of the vehicles
was heavily loaded, inasmuch as it swayed from side to side
whenever the camper changed lanes; when the agents arrived at
the farm they entered it and found marijuana in plain sight in the
barn and smelled it in the trailer in the barn. 5
The majority disposed of the defendants' fourth amendment
claims in one short paragraph:
70 537 F.2d at 1157.
71 Id.
" Id. at 1158. For an examination of the Burger Court's approach to the permissible
scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest, as well as the timeliness thereof (the so-called
contemporaneous requirement), see Lewis, Mannle & Allen, The Burger Court and
Searches Incident to a Lawful Arrest: The Current Perspective, 7 CAP. L. REv. 1 (1977).
Is 576 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1978).




The record demonstrates that there was probable cause for the ar-
rests and the search. The whole train of events, the prior connection
of the vehicles with marijuana transactions, and the information
that a plane would arrive were sufficient. The need to follow the
defendants, and to take action immediately revealed exigent cir-
cumstances.. . . We have held that smell alone is sufficient proba-
ble cause for a search."
Judge McKay penned a potent dissent, arguing that the war-
rantless arrests, searches, and seizures in this case were not based
upon probable cause." Judge McKay elucidated the "prior
connection of the vehicles with marijuana transactions" cited by
the majority as a crucial factor in finding the existence of proba-
ble cause: John Rumpf, known to be the driver of the Chevrolet
van, once rented a storage locker which, sometime subsequent to
his abandonment thereof, was discovered to contain an ounce of
marijuana."' Judge McKay concluded: "The arrests and searches
conducted here were based upon mere suspicion, not facts and
circumstances that would warrant a man of prudence and caution
in believing that the offense had been or was being committed."',
Judge McKay also criticized the majority's reliance on the
plain view and plain smell doctrines, which he pointed out are
applicable only when the observing officer has a right to be in a
position to have that view or smell.80 On the other hand, he con-
tinued, where officers trespass on private property in order to
secure the view or smell, the courts have held that search unrea-
sonable and in violation of the fourth amendment."1 Judge
McKay noted that the Tenth Circuit has previously sanctioned
fourth amendment protection of the curtilage of private homes,
2
and that the marijuana discovered in this case was therefore inad-
missible because "[tihe views and smells came only after the
agents had trespassed the protected area of the curtilage ...
" Id.
" Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
Id. at 828.
"Id. (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1969); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958); and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933)
for the proposition that although probable cause does not contemplate guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, it must rise above the level of mere suspicion).
N Id. at 829 (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)).
91 576 F.2d at 829.
n Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432, 434-35 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
830(1968).
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The evidence was not perceived by the eye or nose of an officer
'who [had] a right to be in the position to have that view [or
smell],' but was uncovered by an unreasonable search.""
Judge McKay was particularly forceful in cautioning his col-
leagues on the court not to permit the fruits of an unlawful search
to color their hindsight judgment of probable cause, noting that
"[tihe tendency to evaluate the lawfulness of a search by the
evidence it produces is especially strong in a case like this where
1500 pounds of marijuana are staring at the court.""4 Expressing
concern that many judges have developed special rules on proba-
ble cause in drug cases, Judge McKay agreed with Judge Richey
of the District of Columbia District Court that "[tihe battle to
rid society of illicit drugs must be won within the framework of
our Constitution lest we achieve a pyrrhic victory. The streets
must be rid of the pusher, but not at the expense of justice, nor
by the compromise of individual liberty."'
G. Stop and Frisk under Terry v. Ohio.
In United States v. Mireles,81 the Tenth Circuit was called
upon to decide the validity of a "stop and frisk" search as mea-
sured by the quidelines of Terry v. Ohio."1 In Terry, the Supreme
Court ruled that a police officer may temporarily detain a person
and conduct a protective pat-down search for weapons on grounds
of less than probable cause18 Under Terry, the validity of a stop
and frisk is governed by a bifurcated "reasonable suspicion" test
directed at determining (1) whether the facts confronting the
officer justified the initial intrusion, and (2) whether the officer's
actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
prompting the interference.8' To justify his actions under either
prong of this test, "the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences" reasonably warrant the officer's belief that the de-
tained person was involved in criminal activity0 or that the
93 576 F.2d at 829 (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)).
" 576 F.2d at 829-30.
" Id. at 830 (citing United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 479
F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
- 583 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1978).
- 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
" 392 U.S. at 27, 29.
0 Id. at 20-21.
" Id. at 21.
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frisked person was armed and dangerous."
Curiously enough, at the beginning of its opinion the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession of an
unregistered sawed-off shotgun in violation of federal law' 2 on the
basis that the officer had probable cause to seize the weapon."
However, the court later stated that the case comes within the
rule of Terry v. Ohio, which was decided according to a less de-
manding standard than that of probable cause.
The facts of Mireles were as follows: A uniformed Albuquer-
que, New Mexico, police officer on routine patrol one evening
stopped at the Rio Bravo Lounge, noted for its incidents of fights,
stabbings, and shootings. While outside the lounge, the officer
noticed that the defendant, who was wearing a long trench coat
and a stocking cap, appeared to be overdressed for the weather.
As the defendant entered the lounge, the officer observed a no-
ticeable and suspicious bulge or lump behind the defendant's
right shoulder, which the officer believed to be a bottle of liquor
being secreted into the bar in violation of state law. In passing
the defendant from the rear for the purpose of questioning him,
the officer felt the bulge in Mireles' trench coat, and this act of
touching convinced him Mireles was carrying a concealed weapon
of some sort. The officer then opened Mireles' trench coat and
saw a sawed-off shotgun, which he grabbed from a sling hanging
from Mireles' neck."
Mireles contended that the warrantless seizure of the shot-
gun from his person violated his fourth amendment rights. In
particular, he argued that the officer should have engaged him in
some preliminary conversation before he touched, from the out-
side, the lump in Mireles' trench coat. The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument, stating that a preliminary conversation was not
required by Terry:
" Id. at 29. See Terry Revisited: Critical Update on Recent Stop-and-Frisk
Developments, 1977 Wi. L. Rzv. 877, 878-79 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Terry
Revisited). After studying the post-Terry cases, model codes, and police manuals, the
commentator concludes that there are six primary variables which, alone or in combina-
tion, are increasingly relied upon in determining the validity of Terry stops: appearance,
conduct, criminal record, environment, police purpose, and source of information. Id. at
885-92.
- 26 U.S.C. It 5861(d), 5871 (1976).
" 583 F.2d at 1116.
mId.
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The Supreme Court in Terry stated that the rea-
sonableness of any search and seizure must be as-
sessed in light of the particular circumstances
against the standard of whether a man of reason-
able caution is warranted in believing that the ac-
tion taken was appropriate. Reasonableness, then,
cannot be determined through the use of a set for-
mula. It depends upon the total picture. 5
Inasmuch as the initial suspected criminal activity in this
case was the mere possession of liquor unlawfully brought onto
the premises, this decision may be subject to the same criticism
as that directed by Mr. Justice Brennan at the majority's decision
in Adams v. Williams." Justice Brennan quoted with approval
those portions of Judge Friendly's dissent to the Second Circuit's
decision in Adams," where Judge Friendly had asserted that
Terry was intended to operate only in situations involving crimes
of violence, and was especially inappropriate authority for cases
involving mere possessory offenses." Justice Brennan shared
Judge Friendly's fear that the extension of Terry's fourth amend-
ment probable cause exception to alleged possessory crimes
might result in "too much danger that instead of the stop being
the object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse
will be true."" It appears from the Tenth Circuit's recitation of
the facts in Mireles that the officer's initial touching of Mireles
was inadvertent. However, if the initial touching was in fact in-
tentional, Justice Brennan's fears have come to pass, for in that
" Id. at 1117.
407 U.S. 143 (1972). Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) had held inadmissible
the fruits of a limited search undertaken pursuant to a stop made on suspicion of narcotics
possession. The Supreme Court in Adams expanded the scope of stop and frisk to encom-
pass criminal activity of a mere possessory character. Terry Revisited, 1977 Wis. L. Rv.
at 884.
17 407 U.S. 143 (1972)(Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d
30, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1971)(Friendly, J., dissenting)).
11 Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (Friendly, J., dissenting). Professor LaFave
has also taken this position. See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. Rav. 39, 65-66 (1968). See also, United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873, 888-89 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" 407 U.S. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30,
38 (1971)(Friendly, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's Adams dissent echoed this fear by
emphasizing that the officer's sole purpose in stopping the defendant was to make the
frisk-that the search was in no way a protective measure undertaken to facilitate an
investigative detention. 407 U.S. at 155-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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event the frisk was indeed the object of the stop, rather than the
incident thereof.
H. Limitation of Habeas Corpus for Fourth Amendment
Claims.
In McDaniel v. State'" and Johnson v. Meacham, "0 the
Tenth Circuit faced questions requiring the application of princi-
ples established by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell. 10 The
Stone Court held that when a state has provided an "opportu-
nity for full and fair litigation" of a fourth amendment claim, a
state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at trial.'0 In both McDaniel and
Johnson, the Tenth Circuit was asked to decide the question of
what constitutes an "opportunity for full and fair litigation."
The habeas corpus claim raised in McDaniel arose out of the
Oklahoma state trial court's receipt into evidence of a pocket
knife seized during a warrantless search of the defendant's parked
car following his arrest. The federal district court denied his peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus, and on appeal the Tenth Circuit
affirmed.'"
The Tenth Circuit pointed to the facts that (1) McDaniel had
objected to introduction of the knife at trial; (2) the court had
admitted the evidence over his objection; and (3) he subsequently
presented this issue on direct appeal to the Oklahoma Criminal
Court of Appeals. In addition, this issue was considered in a full
evidentiary hearing conducted by the state court on his applica-
tion for post-conviction relief, and the denial of his application
- 582 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1978).
570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978).
w 428 U.S. 466 (1976).
- Id. at 494. This decision effectively removes state search and seizure cases from
the ambit of federal habeas corpus. See Green, Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the
Burger Court, 10 CRnmawro L. Rrv. 666 (1977). Professor Green traces the history of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and asserts that Stone has fashioned a judicial excep-
tion to that jurisdiction for search and seizure claims which is not supported by either the
language of the statute or its history. Id. at 668. He concludes that
ihe decision in Stone creates an exception to the broad language of the
Habeas Corpus Act of the type one would expect to find in a proviso to a
statute. The policy arguments amassed in the case are the type which would
support limiting language in the Act. However, no such limitation appears
in the statute. Id. at 677.
See also, id. at 676 n.100.
m 682 F.2d at 1243.
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was affirmed on appeal to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Ap-
peals. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit of the federal district
court's denial of habeas corpus, his primary contention was that
the Oklahoma high court had skirted his fourth amendment
claim by holding that there was substantial evidence apart from
the pocket knife from which a jury could have found the defen-
dant guilty, and that the introduction of the pocket knife was
therefore harmless error.'°0
The Tenth Circuit rejected McDaniel's argument, noting
that Stone v. Powell itself presented the question of whether the
state court's ruling of harmless error with respect to the defen-
dant's fourth amendment claim was reviewable by the federal
district court pursuant to its habeas corpus jurisdiction.'" 6 Noting
that under those circumstances the Supreme Court had found an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of petitioner Powell's fourth
amendment claim, the Tenth Circuit had no qualms about deny-
ing McDaniel's petition for habeas relief. It also pointed to a
recent Sixth Circuit case where a harmless error ruling was held
to preclude federal habeas relief under the Stone standard.'17
A closer question was presented by Johnson v. Meacham,'°0
where the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether the defendant
Johnson had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth
amendment claim where the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to
review that claim due to his failure to make a timely motion to
suppress or a timely objection at trial.'09
Had the Tenth Circuit faced this question prior to the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Wainwright v. Sykes,"l0 it would
have been forced to choose between two conflicting circuit court
interp, tations of the "full and fair opportunity for litigation"
standard mandated by Stone v. Powell. The Second Circuit in
Gates v. Henderson"' had concluded that a federal habeas court
,0 Id. at 1243-44.
10 In Stone, the California state court "found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality
of the arrest and search because it concluded that the error, if any, in admitting the
testimony . ..was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967)." 428 U.S. at 470.
'' Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298, 1300 (6th Cir. 1977).
,# 570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978).
i" Id. at 919.
, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977).
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should apply the Supreme Court's Townsend v. Sain" test; thus
under the Second Circuit's view unless a petitioner intentionally
waives an opportunity to raise his fourth amendment right, a
state court must decide his constitutional claim on the merits."
3
The Fifth Circuit in O'Berry v. Wainwright, "I on the other hand,
held that an opportunity for full and fair litigation is provided
even though a state court never decides a petitioner's constitu-
tional question because the petitioner has failed to comply with
a state procedural requirement."'
The Tenth Circuit, adopting the Fifth Circuit's O'Berry v.
Wainwright reasoning without so much as mentioning the Second
Circuit's contrary ruling in Gates v. Henderson, stated:
[Wle hold that where Johnson presented his Fourth Amendment
claim to the Wyoming Supreme Court, where the Wyoming Su-
preme Court applied an adequate procedural ground in refusing to
reach the merits of that claim, and where Johnson's claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel is not related to this issue, habeas review
of the Fourth Amendment claim is barred."'
The Tenth Circuit probably felt confident in ignoring the
Second Circuit's Gates v. Henderson theory because of the Su-
preme Court's recent ruling in Wainwright v. Sykes,"7 which held
that the defendant's failure to contemporaneously object to the
admission of a confession at trial constitutes an independent
state procedural ground which precludes habeas review."' The
Sykes court expressly rejected the sweeping language of Fay v.
Noia,"' which had been the foundation of the Second Circuit's
12 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Townsend provides a test by which a federal habeas court
determines whether a state court has granted a petitioner a full and fair evidentiary
hearing. The Townsend test incorporates the "deliberate bypass" or "knowing waiver"
rule of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). For a good discussion of Townsend, Fay, and the
early lower court decisions applying Stone v. Powell, see Note, Circuits Split over Applica-
tion of Stone v. Powell's "Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation," 30 VA". L. Rzv. 881
(1977).
10 See Note, Circuits Split over Application of Stone v. Powell's "Opportunity for
Full and Fair Litigation," supra note 112 at 881.
1 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977).
I See Note, Circuits Split over Application of Stone v. Powell's "Opportunity for
Full and Fair Litigation," supra note 112 at 881.
11' 570 F.2d at 920.
"' 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
" Id. at 86-87.
" 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
VOL. 56
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
decision in (rates v. Henderson.2 Fay had rendered a state's
timely-objection rule ineffective to bar review of underlying fed-
eral claims in federal habeas proceedings unless the defendant
had deliberately bypassed the right to so object. 2' Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Sykes court, believed the "deliberate
bypass" rule accorded too little respect to the state timely objec-
tion rule, which he praised as contributing to the finality of crimi-
nal litigation. In contrast, he stated that-the Fay rule may encour-
age defense lawyers to take their chances on a verdict of not guilty
in a state trial court, intending to raise their constitutional claims
in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble fails. 1 The Sykes
majority instead adopted a rule which would bar federal habeas
review in all cases where the defendant fails to timely object
under a state contemporaneous objection rule, unless the defen-
dant shows cause for the noncompliance and also shows actual
prejudice. 
2
Although the Tenth Circuit cited Wainwright v. Sykes in
support of its decision to deny habeas relief in Johnson,'24 it cu-
riously stopped short of applying the "cause" and "prejudice"
tests announced by Sykes. However, the court indirectly ad-
dressed those issues in at least one respect by noting that John-
son's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not related to
his fourth amendment claim.'2
II. FIrTH AMENDMENT
A. Double Jeopardy
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided four cases in
which appellants' double jeopardy claims predominated. Al-
though the court ultimately found all four claims to be without
'2 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977). See notes 111-13 and accompanying text supra.
433 U.S. at 87.
I" d. at 88-89. Justice Rehnquist noted that a state timely objection rule also
achieves other laudable objectives: it enables the record to be made with respect to a
constitutional claim when witnesses' recollections are freshest, and it enables the trial
judge who observed the demeanor of witnesses to make the factual determinations neces-
sary for properly deciding the federal question. Id. at 88.
I'* Id. at 90-91. In enunciating this rule, the Court followed its earlier decision in
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), where the defendant had failed to make a
timely objection to the makeup of a grand jury.
l" 570 F.2d at 920.
'2 Id. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
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merit, one of the double jeopardy issues provoked an interesting
and unusual split of opinion within the court.
In United States v. Rumppf the Tenth Circuit rendered its
decision on a case of first impression: the appealability of the
denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy
grounds. The appellants' first trial on a charge of conspiracy to
possess marijuana with intent to distribute ended in a declaration
of mistrial. When they moved for dismissal in the second trial on
double jeopardy grounds, their motion was denied. The appel-
lants immediately lodged notices of appeal from this denial. The
second trial commenced later the same day, resulting in appel-
lants' convictions. On appeal, appellants urged that their notices
of appeal from the denial of the motion divested the trial court
of jurisdiction to proceed with the second trial.
In resolving the issue of the appealability of the motion's
denial, the Tenth Circuit looked to Abney v. United States, 127 a
Supreme Court case decided during the pendency of the appeal.
The Supreme Court in A bney held that the district court's
pretrial order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the indict-
ment on double jeopardy grounds was a "final decision,"'n sub-
ject to immediate appeal. In support of this holding, the Supreme
Court stressed the importance of protecting the defendant from
exposure to the additional emotional strain and expense occa-
sioned by a second trial before determination of the double jeop-
ardy issue.'"
The applicability of the A bney decision to the facts in Rumpf
caused a split opinion in the Tenth Circuit case. The majority
held the pretrial protection made possible under Abney inapplic-
able, since Rumpf's second trial was over before Abney was de-
cided. 30 The majority stressed the fact that the appellants made
no special effort to "perfect" the appeal either prior to or during
the second trial.'' Since Abney was held inapplicable, Rumpf's
second trial was not barred by the double jeopardy prohibition,
and the convictions were upheld.
576 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1978).
"' 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
' Id. at 662.
IB d. at 661.
" 576 F.2d at 821.
'Id. at 822 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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In his dissenting opinion, Judge McKay addressed the spe-
cific issue raised by the appellants: did the appellants' notice of
appeal divest the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with the
second trial? Generally, a trial court is divested of jurisdiction
when there is a valid appeal from an appealable order; thus,
Judge McKay's opinion analyzed what constitutes a valid appeal
and an appealable order. He concluded: (1) that under the Abney
holding orders rejecting double jeopardy claims are final deci-
sions, i.e., appealable orders;' and, (2) that since changes in the
law are given effect when the case is on direct review,'3 A bney
should apply to the Rumpf case. In contrast to the majority opin-
ion, Judge McKay determined that there was no need to
"perfect" the appeal; the timely filing of the notice of appeal *as
sufficient regardless of the fact that the trial court was proceeding
as though the order were nonappealable.'" In finding that the
valid appeal taken from an appealable order terminated the trial
court's jurisdiction, Judge McKay concluded that the second trial
was a nullity and consequently that the judgments entered
against the appellants should be vacated.'3
The other three double jeopardy cases decided by the Tenth
Circuit involved much more traditional issues and consequently
received more summary treatment from the court.
In United States v. Nelson, 136 the defendant was convicted of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after a mistrial had
occasioned the need for a second trial. The defendant alleged that
the second trial was both without manifest necessity and the
result of prosecutorial overreaching.
In rejecting the defendant's first claim, the Tenth Circuit
stressed that the mistrial was declared upon the express motion
of defense counsel." 7 Furthermore, the court deemed the trial
judge's -evaluation of the effect of improper comment on the im-
partiality of the jury to be worthy of the "highest degree of re-
spect."'' 38 In response to defendant's claim of prosecutorial over-
1N Id. at 825.
13 Id.
11 Id. at 826.
I3 Id.
"' 582 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1978).
"31 Id. at 1248.
1" Id. at 1249. The court relied on Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
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reaching, the court held that the double jeopardy clause is in-
tended to protect defendants from prosecutorial actions inten-
tionally designed to provoke a request for a mistrial."' In Nelson's
case, there was no evidence indicating the presence of any such
prosecutorial scheme, especially since the prosecution's case was
not materially strengthened by the one-day delay resulting from
the declaration of mistrial."10 Therefore, the court concluded that
defendant's double jeopardy claim was without merit.
In United States v. Wagstaff,"' the Tenth Circuit considered
the applicability of the double jeopardy bar to a prosecution fol-
lowing the dismissal of an indictment alleged to be insufficient
for failure to cite the statute violated by the defendant. The de-
fendant claimed that the dismissal was tantamount to a resolu-
tion of the cause in his favor.
Relying on Lee v. United States, 2 the court of appeals dis-
tinguished those rulings based on procedural or drafting inade-
quacies from those based on the merits, and ruled that the former
are not tantamount to a merits resolution in the defendant's
favor."8 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a dismissal on
formal or procedural grounds does not constitute sufficient jeop-
ardy to bar reprosecution."
4
The indictment, to be sufficient, must state those facts
which describe the essential elements of the offense so as to suffi-
ciently apprise the accused of the nature of the offense."15 When
these basic requirements are met, as they were in Wagstaff, the
omission of the citation of the statute violated is not so significant
as to justify dismissal."' Therefore, the court ordered the indict-
ment reinstated."W
In United States v. Martinez, " the Tenth Circuit addressed
the applicability of the double jeopardy bar to successive indict-
ments in two different jurisdictions. In Martinez, the defendants
1" 582 F.2d at 1249. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976).
'682 F.2d at 1249.
' 572 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1978).
aa 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
* 572 F.2d at 272.
Id.
I ld. at 273.
, See Fa. R. Cmm. P. 7 (c)(3).
" 572 F.2d at 273.
*" 562 F.2d 633 (10th Cir. 1977).
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were first indicted in Texas for conspiracy to possess marijuana
with intent to distribute, but were granted a directed verdict of
acquittal after suppression of certain evidence. Subsequently, the
defendants were indicted in Oklahoma on a very similar conspir-
acy charge which encompassed some of the same agreements and
transactions which had formed the basis of the Texas indictment.
The defendants argued that (1) the Texas indictment was merely
a "slice" of the more comprehensive Oklahoma indictment; (2)
the various agreements and transactions were part of one continu-
ing conspiracy; and, (3) therefore the double jeopardy clause
mandated dismissal of the Oklahoma indictment.
The Tenth Circuit discussed two tests in passing on the mer-
its of defendants' double jeopardy claim. In determining whether
or not the offenses charged were so identical in law and fact as to
allow attachment of a double jeopardy claim, the court of appeals
relied on the test enunciated in Robbins v. United States:'
49
whether the facts alleged in one offense, if offered in support of
the other offense, would sustain a conviction.'15 The court ruled
that there was an insufficient connection between the agreements
and dealings in the two indictments to satisfy the "identical"
requirement.' In treating the specific issue of the degree of same-
ness of the conspiracies, the court recalled the test used in
Bartlett v. United States:'52 whether evidence supporting the
criminal agreement in one indictment would likewise establish
the criminal agreement in the other indictment. 15 Under this test
the court held that the defendants had not established that the
agreements embraced by each indictment were equivalent to one
overall conspiracy."' The court buttressed its denial of the double
jeopardy claim by emphasizing that sameness of parties and simi-
larity of transactions do not combine to prove that the two con-
spiracies are the same.'
1' 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 32.
"' 562 F.2d at 637.
52 166 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1948).
,' Id. at 931.





In United States v. Revada,'5 the government appealed the
trial court's dismissal of an indictment for illegal possession of a
shotgun on the basis of a twenty-one month delay between the
discovery of the weapon and the issuance of the indictment. The
Tenth Circuit enunciated principles governing the legal conse-
quences of pre-indictment delay with reference to two recent
United States Supreme Court cases.
In United States v. Marion"' the Supreme Court suggested
a two-pronged test for determining the propriety of dismissal of
an indictment: (1) the delay must cause substantial prejudice to
the defendant's right to a fair trial; and (2) the delay must have
been merely a device used to gain tactical advantage over the
accused.I" The Tenth Circuit had previously construed Marion as
requiring the satisfaction of both tests in order to establish a
definitive due process violation.1 9 The Supreme Court confirmed
this interpretation in United States v. Lovasco, '0 a recent deci-
sion refining the principles announced in Marion.
Revada alleged that the lengthy delay dimmed recall of his
activities during the period of time surrounding his arrest, and
that this impairment of recall impeded his ability to defend on
the charges. The government responded that the delay was un-
avoidable in light of the need to conduct further investigations.
In addressing these contentions, the Tenth Circuit relied on the
Marion and Lovasco decisions. Marion indicated that the possi-
bility of loss of accurate recall does not so conclusively demon-
strate denial of a fair trial as to justify dismissal of the indict-
ment.' 16 Lavasco develops the other prong of the Marion test
by excluding preindictment investigative delay from the realm
of maneuvers undertaken chiefly to gain an advantage over the
accused.6 2 In view of the trial court's failure to consider and
apply the standards set out in Marion and reaffirmed in Lovasco,
the appellate court remanded the case for determination of the
574 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1978).
404 U.S. 307 (1971).
'Id. at 325.
5 674 F.2d at 1048. See United States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1972).
W 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
"'404 U.S. at 325-26.
431 U.S. at 795-96.
VOL. 56
CRIMINAL LA W AND PROCEDURE
actual prejudice and justifiable delay issues.
In Von Atkinson v. Smith, 63 the defendant was charged with
violating a sodomy statute which was repealed before the defen-
dant had pleaded guilty or been sentenced. The new statute re-
categorized the original offense as a misdemeanor and simulta-
neously created the new crime of forcible sodomy. The practical
effect of the change on the defendant was simply to reduce his
sentence for a crime with which he had not been technically
charged and to which he had not pleaded guilty. The defendant
alleged that such sentencing for an uncharged crime constituted
a strict violation of his due process rights. The district court
discharged defendant from custody pursuant to defendant's peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus.
The Tenth Circuit not only affirmed defendant's discharge
from custody, it also stressed that the new statutory provision
for a lesser sentence was entirely irrelevant to the due process
deprivation which necessarily arises when one is convicted and
sentenced for an uncharged crime."' The court concluded:
"[Djue process does not permit one to be tried, convicted or
sentenced for a crime with which he has not been charged or
about which he has not been properly notified.'
'' 5
C. Privilege Against Self Incrimination
In United States v. DiGiacomo,'" the Tenth Circuit dis-
cussed the necessity for and adequacy of Miranda warnings deliv-
ered during an interrogation. Four secret service agents detained
the defendant in the parking lot of a restaurant. They separated
the defendant from his companion and advised him that they
wished to talk to him about his alleged passing of counterfeit
money. Prior to any actual questioning, the agents advised the
defendant that he had a right to remain silent, that whatever he
said could be used against him, and that he had a right to have
an attorney with him during questioning. There was disputed
testimony regarding the advisement of his right to have an attor-
ney appointed should he be unable to afford one. During the
'u 575 F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1978).
I' Id. at 821.
"' Id. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S.
329, 334 (1941); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937).
1- 579 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir. 1978).
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course of the questioning the agents referred to the possibility of
immediate arrest and the defendant made certain inculpatory
statements. The following morning the defendant went to the
secret service office for further questioning, but while there he
refused to sign a waiver form. In urging reversal of the order
suppressing the defendant's statement, the government argued
that the Miranda warnings were unnecessary, or, alternatively,
sufficient.
In Oregon v. Mathiason, "7 the Supreme Court interpreted
the requirement that Miranda warnings be given whenever the
defendant is "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."'' Distinguishing the Mathiason situation' from the
DiGiacomo facts, the Tenth Circuit held that the agents' separa-
tion of the defendant from his companion and their implied
threats of arrest and general suspicions were sufficiently equiva-
lent to an arrest to require the giving of Miranda warnings. 70 The
court further held that the omission of the advisement of the right
to appointed counsel rendered the warnings fatally deficient. " ,
Since the warnings were deficient, the defendant's inculpatory
statements made in the parking lot were not voluntary. 2 With
regard to the statements made in the secret service office, the
court ruled that the defendant's refusal to sign a waiver and his
reluctance to respond to subsequent questions prohibited the
finding of a valid waiver. 73 Therefore, the trial court's suppres-
sion of the defendant's statements was proper.
Dissenting Judge Barrett took issue with the majority's inter-
pretation of the applicability of Mathiason. He reasoned that a
coercive environment does not in itself mandate Miranda warn-
ings, and that the agents' "requests" for cooperation in the park-
ing lot did not deprive the defendant of his freedom in any signifi-
cant way.' 7' He also indicated that the trial court erred in ruling
that there was any uncertainty surrounding the alleged omission
',1 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
0 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
'0 Mathiason came voluntarily to the police station and his freedom to depart was
not restricted. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495.
"S 579 F.2d at 1214.
1 Id.
I Id. at 1215.
iSId.
Id. at 1217 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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from the warnings of the right to appointed counsel. "5 He con-
cluded his dissent with a lengthy advocation of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, especially section
3501.178
The issue of voluntariness arose again in United States v.
Bambulas.7  Defendant claimed that prosecutorial coercion al-
legedly occurring during a plea bargain stripped his guilty plea
of the requisite voluntariness. 8
In ruling that defendant's contention was without merit, the
Tenth Circuit emphasized that the defendant's prior denial of
any coercion with respect to his guilty plea should be regarded as
conclusive absent a contrary showing of coercion.' 9 In so holding,
the court also tendered its support for a properly conducted plea
bargaining arrangement. 80
In United States v. Blakney, "I defendant was convicted of
transporting a counterfeit check in interstate commerce. Hand-
writing exemplars were ordered, not to support this charge, but
to support certain of defendant's prior, uncharged offenses. The
defendant refused to comply with the order, and his refusal be-
came the subject of subsequent commentary. The defendant at-
tempted to justify his refusal by arguing that under these circum-
stances the order violated his privilege against self-incrimination.
In rejecting defendant's argument, the Tenth Circuit first
enunciated the general rule that handwriting exemplars are iden-
tifying rather than testimonial evidence, thus lying outside the
scope of the privilege. 82 The court then refused to recognize any
reason for not applying the general rule where, as here, the exem-
I" Id.
' This section favors an evaluation of the voluntariness of the incriminating state-
ments rather than a mechanical application of the Miranda formula. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(1976).
571 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1978).
The defendant also alleged that the involuntariness of his plea was further sub-
stantiated by the denial of his right to a speedy trial. In response, the court stated that
pre-indictment delay does not constitute a due process violation absent actual prejudice
and an intention to gain a tactical advantage over the accused. 571 F.2d at 527. See text
accompanying notes 156-62 supra.
"1 571 F.2d at 526.
"0 Id. The court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized the potential benefits
of the plea bargaining system in Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
581 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id Id. at 1390. This rule was enunciated in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67
(1967).
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plars were ordered to substantiate uncharged crimes.' The
court further held that since the exemplars were unprotected, no
prejudice could attach to the comments illuminating the defen-
dant's refusal to comply with the order. 84 The court thus distin-
guished the commentary in this case from that made upon a
defendant's exercise of clearly established privileges." 5
In United States v. Nolan, " the defendant had been con-
victed in 1966 of conspiracy to use and actual use of interstate
facilities to carry on an unlawful gambling business, and had first
appealed his conviction in 1970. During the trial, several persons
referred to defendant's possession of a Federal Wagering Tax
Stamp. Counsel for defendant made no objection to these refer-
ences. On his second appeal the defendant requested an order
vacating his sentence on the grounds that the trial references
violated his privilege against self-incrimination, and that the law
of waiver had changed during the years intervening between his
first and second appeal. The defendant had registered his initial
appellate claim in the light of two United States Supreme Court
cases1 holding that the assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination would provide a complete defense to the failure to
comply with statutory requirements to file for or to pay wagering
taxes.'9 On his second appeal, defendant urged that the retroac-
tive application of these holdings should inure to his benefit.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. First, the court confirmed its
previous observation that defendant's counsel, while fully aware
of the pending Marchetti and Grosso decisions, had failed to ob-
ject to the tax stamp references. Such failure amounted to a
knowledgeable waiver of the privilege.'" Secondly, the court re-
fused to endorse retroactive application of the Marchetti and
Grosso holdings because appellant's conduct was not immune
"1 581 F.2d at 1390. In support of this position the court referred to United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973), in which the Supreme Court allowed the grand jury to see
exemplars linking the prospective defendant with the crime under investigation.
IU 581 F.2d at 1390.
IR Id. at 1391.
' 571 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968).
I" Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. at 64-72 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. at 60-61 (1968).
1" 571 F.2d at 531.
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from punishment under those holdings.Im Therefore, the trial
references forming the basis of the defendant's second appellate
claim did not constitute a violation of his privilege against self-
incrimination.
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Right to Counsel
Six Tenth Circuit cases in the past term involved issues con-
cerning a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. The
decisions can be grouped into four distinct aspects of that right:
(1) the right to counsel generally; (2) the right to appointed coun-
sel; (3) the right to counsel of defendant's own choosing; and (4)
the right to effective assistance of counsel.
1. Right to counsel generally
In Robinson v. Benson,"' defendant appealed from a district
court order denying habeas corpus relief. While awaiting parole
on conviction of interstate transportation of stolen securities, de-
fendant was arrested on charges of attempting to pass a bad
check. At a hearing before the jail's disciplinary committee, and
again at his parole rescission hearing, "' defendant was informed
that he had no right to counsel, but could be represented by a
staff member of the institution. On appeal, defendant raised the
question of what due process rights, including the right to coun-
sel, must be afforded in parole rescission hearings."
3
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's contention that he
had an absolute right to counsel in parole rescission hearings. The
court noted that in parole revocation hearings appointment of
counsel is discretionary,"' and then ruled that in the rescission
'" Id. at 532.
"' 570 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1978).
192 On August 1, 1976, defendant Robinson was informed by the disciplinary commit-
tee that probable cause had been found for rescission of his parole. The final rescission
hearing was held on December 14, 1976, even though the bad check charge had been
dismissed on October 13. Robinson's parole grant was rescinded at the December 14
hearing. Id. at 922.
In Id. The Fifth Circuit had considered what due process rights must be afforded a
defendant in parole rescission hearings in two cases, but neither case specifically ad-
dressed the right to counsel. MacIntosh v. Woodward, 514 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1975); Sexton
v. Wise, 494 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1974).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1976) provides that in parole revocation proceedings, a
defendant may be furnished representation of counsel where the interests of justice so
1979
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context there was likewise no right to counsel, at least where
defendant had agreed to be represented by a staff member.'95
The court did not decide whether the constitution requires
any representation at all. Here, Robinson was represented by a
staff member-nothing more was required.
2. Right to appointed counsel
The case of United States v. DiGiacomolll is one of the rela-
tively rare Tenth Circuit cases in which the government appealed
an adverse ruling of the trial court.'17 Defendant was indicted for
possessing and passing counterfeit money with intent to de-
fraud.' The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress
a counterfeit bill seized from defendant and statements made by
defendant to government agents.'
The testimony at the suppression hearing conflicted as to
what Miranda2 rights had been given to defendant by any of the
four government agents who stopped defendant in a restaurant
parking lot. The trial court ruled that the government had failed
to establish that defendant was properly advised of his right to
appointed counsel and of his right to terminate questioning at
any time.3 '
The Tenth Circuit agreed, ruling that "the right to appointed
counsel is a significant right which cannot be excluded from the
advisement.1 2 2 The court further ruled that, although proper
warnings were given the next morning, no waiver would be pre-
require and defendant is financially unable to afford such representation. See also Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783-91 (1973).
570 F.2d at 923.
579 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) allows a government appeal to the court of appeals from
any decision of the district court suppressing or excluding evidence, if the United States
attorney certifies that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence
is material.
1- 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976).
'0 For a discussion of the fifth amendment aspects of DiGiacomo, see text accompa-
nying notes 166-76 supra.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966), specifically required that an
indigent defendant be advised that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed
for him: "Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with
counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if
he has one or has funds to obtain one." Id. at 473.
' 579 F.2d at 1214.
m'Id.
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sumed. Once defendant refused to sign the waiver form, proof of
waiver of his rights could be shown "only by the strongest evi-
dence." 12 0 Therefore, exclusion of the evidence was proper.
Dissenting Judge Barrett, relying on the Supreme Court's
decison in Oregon v. Mathiason,1"4 concluded that the parking
lot questioning was not custodial and did not require Miranda
warnings at all "5 Even assuming the necessity of such warn-
ings, Judge Barrett stated, all Miranda warnings had been given
with the "possible exception" of defendant's right to appointed
counsel.2
The dissent seems to imply that the right to appointed coun-
sel may be excluded from the advisement without affecting its
validity. The Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda, however, that
the advisement must include the "express explanation" of an
indigent's right to appointed counsel,m is directly contrary to the
dissenting position.
3. Right to counsel of defendant's own choosing
In two cases during the last term, defendants questioned the
trial court's denial of their right to counsel of their own choosing.
In one case, the preferred attorney was sick, and in the other case,
the attorney had been disbarred by another state.
In United States v. McCoy,2" defendant was charged along
with seven other defendants with conspiring to import marijuana
into the United States from Mexico.2w Defendant entered a nolo
contendere plea and was sentenced. On appeal, defendant alleged
that the nolo plea was taken in violation of her right to be repre-
sented by counsel of her own choosing.
Defendant was represented by two attorneys, one from Chi-
20 Id at 1215.
ml 429 U.S. 492 (1977). In Mathiason, the Supreme Court held that defendant's
voluntary appearance at the police station obviated the necessity of Miranda warnings,
and that the half-hour interrogation was proper without warnings because defendant's
freedom to depart was not restricted in any way. Id. at 495.
2m Judge Barrett noted that the government agents did not require defendant to
remain in the parking lot, but only requested that he remain until other agents could ask
some questions. 579 F.2d at 1217 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
= Id.
m Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966).
- 573 F.2d 14 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3073 (1978).
IN 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) (1976).
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cago and the other a local attorney from Albuquerque. On the
night before defendant was to enter her plea, her Chicago counsel
became too ill to attend court, and the Albuquerque attorney
expressed a reluctance to proceed.2 10 The trial court indicated its
desire to proceed, and defendant and her attorney agreed to do
so.
The Tenth Circuit, after carefully reviewing the trial court's
questioning of defendant as to the voluntariness of her nolo plea,
ruled that defendant had not been denied counsel of her own
choosing. The record showed that, at the time of sentencing sev-
eral weeks after defendant entered her plea, neither defendant
nor her counsel, an associate of her Chicago counsel, "gave any
indication that they did not want to persist in the nolo contendere
plea. 21' Nor was any dissatisfaction expressed after sentence was
imposed. Thus, despite the fact that the plea was entered without
her Chicago attorney, defendant persisted in that plea, and had
adequate representation at all pertinent times.
2 12
Defendant in United States v. Grismore2 13 alleged denial of
his sixth amendment right to counsel because the trial court had
denied his request that Jerome Daly, a disbarred Minnesota law-
yer,214 be permitted to represent him. When the trial court ap-
211 573 F.2d at 16. The Albuquerque attorney's reluctance was based on the possibility
of a conflict of interest. One of McCoy's codefendants was also his client, and that codefen-
dant might have been called as a witness against McCoy. Id. The court rejected any claim
of a possible conflict because the record indicated that McCoy did not intend to proceed
to trial. Id. at 17.
211 Id.
"I Id. The court looked to the "totality of (the] circumstances that prevailed during
all the pre-trial and trial proceedings." Id. (quoting McHenry v. United States, 420 F.2d
927 (10th Cir. 1970)).
"1 564 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1586 (1978). The court noted
that the real thrust of defendant's appeal was not a sixth amendment claim, but rather
"a tirade against the Federal Reserve System, the Internal Revenue Service, the federal
judiciary, and lawyers." 564 F.2d at 930. The court also noted that defendant's attacks
were based on religious and political views, and ruled that the claims merited no discus-
sion. Id.
211 See In Re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 189 N.W.2d 176 (1971). Daly was disbarred for
intentionally disregarding a court order prohibiting him and a justice of the peace from
further proceedings in a declaratory judgment action which the Minnesota Supreme Court
had ruled was beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.
Grismore apparently sought Daly's assistance in representing him because Daly
sought to attack the constitutionality of the monetary system of the United States-the
same attack Grismore raised before the Tenth Circuit. See note 213 supra. The Minnesota
court rejected Daly's position, and entered judgment of disbarment.
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pointed local Utah counsel instead of the disbarred attorney, de-
fendant chose to represent himself against charges of uttering and
dealing in counterfeit obligations of the United States. 15
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's sixth amendment
claim, noting that "the appointed lawyer was available through-
out the trial to assist the defendant but his services were neither
requested nor used."2 6 Citing its earlier decision involving the
same defendant and the same issue, 2 1 the court ruled that defen-
dant was not deprived of any sixth amendment right to counsel.
4. Right to effective assistance of counsel
The Tenth Circuit ruled in two cases decided during the last
year that one who claims a deprivation of adequate assistance of
counsel faces a heavy burden of proof. In both of last term's cases,
the court held that defendant had failed to meet that burden.
In United States v. Nelson,"' the defendant appealed from
his conviction for possession wih intent to distribute heroin. 2 ,
Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial when the prosecution
elicited a prejudicial statement from the agent who had arrested
defendant to the effect that defendant was a "major trafficker"
of drugsY0 The second trial commenced the following day, and
resulted in defendant's conviction. On appeal, defendant urged
that his attorney's failure to file a motion to dismiss the indict-
ment on double jeopardy grounds' 1 was the "most glaring exam-
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 472, 473 (1976).
21 564 F.2d at 931.
"' United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1976). In this earlier opinion,
the court ruled that a disbarred lawyer was the equivalent of a lay person and that the
sixth amendment right to counsel did not include a lay person. The court then concluded:
"Even in those instances where it has been held to be permissible for a lay person to
represent a criminal defendant, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to disallow
such representation." Id. at 847.
21 582 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1978).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
582 F.2d at 1248. Defense counsel cross-examined federal officers extensively about
the involvement of Carl Arico, an intermediary between defendant and federal agents who
had not been indicted. The prosecutor responded by asking why charges had not been
brought against Arico, to which the agents responded that their main goal was to prose-
cute the "major traffickers." Id.
21 On appeal, defendant alleged two arguments in support of his claim that the
second trial violated the double jeopardy clause: 1) the mistrial was declared by the court
sua sponte, and without manifest necessity; and 2) the mistrial resulted from judicial or
prosecutorial overreaching. Id. The Tenth Circuit rejected both arguments. Defendant,
not the court, had moved for mistrial, and, although the prosecutor had erred in eliciting
1979
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pie" of ineffective assistance.
Having ruled that the prosecutor's error in eliciting the state-
ment was not made in bad faith," the Tenth Circuit ruled that
the failure to file such a motion did not deprive defendant of his
right to effective representation. Nor did any other retrospective
criticism of counsel merit reversal:
One who claims such a deprivation faces a heavy burden. Adequacy
of legal representation is measured neither by hindsight nor suc-
cess .... The standard of adequacy of counsel in this circuit is that
a defendant will be considered to have had adequate counsel unless
counsel's representation at trial was of such a substandard level as
to render the trial a mockery of justice and a sham.2
The court concluded that defendant might criticize some of the
tactics employed at trial, but such criticism was not sufficient to
meet his heavy burden of proof.
In United States v. Seely,2 2the Tenth Circuit held that trial
counsel's death during a recess in the midst of trial did not sup-
port defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel. The court noted that defendant's attorney died of a heart
attack on Thursday afternoon, and that the trial had been contin-
ued until the following Monday when an associate of the deceased
counsel took over. 5 The record reflected both that no further
continuance was requested and that the substitute counsel was
familiar with much of what had already transpired. The court
concluded that defendant's mere allegation that the conviction
may have resulted from substituted counsel's inexperience was
insufficient to meet his burden of showing ineffective assis-
tance.26
the statement, defendant failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor acted in bad faith. Id.
at 1248-49.
2 See note 221 supra.
w 582 F.2d at 1250 (citations omitted).
2 570 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Defendant's argument hinged on whether "inexperienced" counsel could be pro-
perly substituted for "seasoned" counsel, without prejudice to defendant. Although the
court did not address the issue directly, it did adopt the "inexperienced" versus
"seasoned" language, and then ruled that defendant was not prejudiced by the substitu-
tion. Id. at 323-24.
2 Id. See Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1010 (1971).
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B. Right to Confront and Cross-examine Witnesses
In United States v. Lamb,'" four codefendants were con-
victed of numerous charges, including armed robbery, kidnap-
ping, and transportation of stolen vehicles across state lines.
Among the arguments raised on appeal, n 8 three codefendants
urged that the fourth defendant's assertion of his fifth amend-
ment privilege on cross-examination denied them their right to
confront him as a witness against them.
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendants' claim, ruling that the
record reflected that neither the Government's questions nor the
one defendant's responses implicated the other three in any man-
ner. Nor did any of the three defendants request the opportunity
to cross-examine: "Thus, where coappellants had the opportunity
to cross-examine [the fourth defendant] if they desired to do so,
there appears to be no denial of the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation. ' ' 30
In Robinson v. Benson,21 the Tenth Circuit ruled that the
opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses is not absolutely
essential in a parole rescission hearing. The court noted that
the right to call witnesses is conditional in the context of a prison
disciplinary proceeding, 32 and that the opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses was not absolutely required in parole revoca-
tion matters. m Thus, confrontation in the context of a parole
rescission was not an essential constitutional right.23
- 575 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir. 1978).
21 Various defendants argued violation of their fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination, the admissibility of prior convictions, and the admissibility of prior crimi-
nal activity. One interesting, if not noteworthy, ground for appeal was that one of the
defendants had been ordered to shave his beard because he had been clean-shaven at the
time of the robbery. On appeal, that defendant claimed that the order was violative of
his fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination. The court disagreed, ruling that
such an order required defendant only to give non-testimonial evidence. Id. at 1316.
"" Defendant Clary had elected to testify in his own defense, and then exercised the
privilege on cross-examination. Id. at 1314.
"I Id. See United States v. Troutman, 458 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1972). The court in
Lamb refused to speculate on what might have happened if the other defendants had
chosen to cross-examine the fourth defendant. 575 F.2d at 1314.
-' 570 F.2d 920 (lOthCir. 1978). For other aspects of this case, see text accompanying
notes 191-95 supra.
*" 570 F.2d at 922 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
570 F.2d at 922 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
0 570 F.2d at 923. It should be noted that this decision is based more on the due
process clause than on the confrontation clause. Both of the Supreme Court decisions
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C. Right to Speedy Trial
In United States v. Grismore,5 defendant asserted violation
of both the Speedy Trial Act236 and his sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial. Defendant was originally indicted on June 17,
1975, and arraigned on July 15, 1975. Trial did not begin until
March 11, 1976,2r and defendant appealed his conviction because
of the delay.
First, the Tenth Circuit addressed defendant's alleged viola-
tion of two sections of the Speedy Trial Act. The court ruled that
one provision, section 3161,m was not applicable to indictments
handed down before July 1, 1976. Moreover, Utah's interim plan
adopted pursuant to section 3164 2 was also inapplicable because
defendant was tried within the 180 day time period following the
effective date of the rule. 20
Second, the court addressed defendant's allegation that he
was denied his constitutional right to speedy trial. The court
reviewed the four pertinent factors announced by the Supreme
Court in Barker v. Wingo:"4 "length of delay, the reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant."24 2 The court noted that the nine month delay be-
tween indictment and trial was caused in large part by the diffi-
relied upon by the Tenth Circuit in Robinson (see text accompanying notes 232 and 233
supra) address the applicability of the due process clause to analogous factual situations.
Robinson is nonetheless included here because defendant asserted his right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses at his parole rescission hearing.
m 564 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1586 (1978). For other aspects
of this case, see text accompanying notes 213-17 supra.
= 18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174 (1976). SubsectionUc) of section 3161 provides generally that
the arraignment of a defendant must be held within 10 days of the indictment or informa-
tion, and that trial must commence within 60 days thereafter.
23 The case was assigned to Judge Anderson who recused himself. The case was
reassigned to Judge Powell who died. The third judge, Judge Ritter, recused himself, and
the case returned to Judge Anderson. On January 29, 1976-seven months after indict-
ment-the case was assigned to Judge Brimmer. Trial commenced two months later. 564
F.2d at 932.
23 See note 236 supra.
18 U.S.C. § 3164 (1976) provides that each district shall place into operation an
interim plan-until the effective date of § 3161, i.e., July 1, 1976-"to assure priority in
trial or other disposition" of cases. The Utah plan discussed in Grismore became effective
September 29, 1975, and defendant was tried approximately five months later. 564 F.2d
at 932.
' See note 239 supra.
uI 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
U42 Id. at 530, quoted in United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d at 932.
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culty in obtaining a judge."' The record, however, reflected no
request by the defendant for trial, nor any prejudice caused by
the delay. Under such circumstances, the court ruled, defendant
had a fair trial and was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial
under the sixth amendment. " '
IV. TRLAL MATrERS
A. Pretrial Matters
1. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing
United States v. Vandivere2 5 was a case of first impression
discussing the sufficiency of furnishing an indigent defendant
with a tape recording of the preliminary hearing in lieu of a writ-
ten transcript. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Britt v. North Carolina2 4 as establishing two controlling guide-
lines for determining whether an indigent defendant must be pro-
vided a transcript: " '(1) the value of the transcript to the de-
fendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is
sought, and (2) the availability of alternative devices that would
fulfill the same functions as a transcript.' ",247
The district court judge ruled that the defendant should be
given access to a full tape recording of the preliminary examina-
tion, and the appellate court accepted his determination that a
transcript "or its equivalent"2 would be of value to defendant in
the preparation of his case.
The opinion centered primarily on whether a tape recording
of a preliminary hearing is an alternative device "equivalent" to
a transcript. The court noted that the presumption should be that
indigent defendants in criminal cases are entitled to transcripts
of any preliminary examination.24 This presumption appears to
be based on the language in United States v. Jonas-althoughan
informal alternative substantially equivalent to a transcript is
available under Britt, in the "overwhelming majority of cases
• ..tape recordings or judicial notes will [not] suffice."0 Rule
24 See note 237 supra.
1,4 564 F.2d at 932.
2- 579 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1978).
2U 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
"1 404 U.S. at 227, quoted in United States v. Vandivere, 579 F.2d at 1242.
2 579 F.2d at 1242.
2,, Id. at 1243.
540 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1976); FED. R. Cram. P. 5.1.
1979
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5.1 adopted in the aftermath of Britt, provides the method for
securing tape recordings and written transcripts of preliminary
hearings. The purpose of the rule is to eliminate the delay and
expense of written transcripts where listening to a tape recording
would be sufficient.
Given the authority to evaluate the expediency of a tape
recording as an alternative, the Tenth Circuit seemed to focus on
the complexity of the proceeding as the determinative factor of
the tape's sufficiency The court in Vandivere stressed the sim-
plicity and brevity of the trial, and that the government agent's
testimony did not vary between the hearing and the trial. The
facts in Jonas were distinguished: there had been two trials sepa-
rated by two and one half months, and different attorneys had
represented the defendant at each trial."'
While brevity and simplicity may be desirable ends, the re-
sult of the Vandivere analysis may contribute to a premature
determination of simplicity that could foreclose or diminish the
defendant's ability to develop and prepare a legitimately complex
defense. Certainly both Jonas and Vandivere caution that the
presumption that a defendant is entitled to a written transcript
should not be lightly discarded.
2. Stipulation
United States v. Haro 2 illustrates the potential danger of
stipulation in a criminal case, since the government is thereby
relieved of the burden of proving that element of the crime. Haro
was convicted of possessing unregistered grenades. 2s At the con-
clusion of the government's case-in-chief, the parties stipulated
that the grenades were devices as described in the indictment and
subject to the applicable statute. Haro entered into the stipula-
tion unaware that the grenades had been prepared by the govern-
ment witness as exemplar devices in an unrelated trial. On appeal
defendant argued that the stipulation was the only evidence es-
tablishing the destructive character of the grenades, 254 and that
"' 579 F.2d at 1242.
V2 5"3 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 156 (1978).
26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5845, 5861 (1954).
"' The essence of defendant's motion for dismissal was that the government had
failed to show that the weapons were characteristically destructive within the meaning of
the statute, thereby alerting him of the need for registration. 573 F.2d at 663.
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counsel would not have entered into the stipulation had he known
that the grenades were exemplar devices.n5
The Tenth Circuit ruled that nondisclosure by the govern-
ment witness did not give rise to reversible error and that Haro
could not be afforded relief from his stipulation.25 Furthermore,
the court noted that even if the witness' nondisclosure had
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, Haro would not be af-
forded relief because he failed to establish that knowledge of these
facts would have led to a different result on retrial.
25
1
The court's opinion suggests that the criminal defendant
risks a crucial concession when he enters into any stipulation, and
that even when the stipulation is a product of government mis-
conduct the defendant will have the onerous burden of showing
precisely how his case has been damaged as a result of the stipula-
tion.
3. Motion to Supress-Chain of Custody
In Edwards v. Oklahomau the Tenth Circuit voted to reverse
a defendant's conviction. The reversal was predicated on an inad-
equately explained break in the chain of custody as a result of
destruction of the evidence by its custodian. Defendant Edwards
was arrested for drunk driving. He was given the standard breath-
alyzer test, and the ampoule was subsequently destroyed by the
operator pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Board of
Chemical Tests.Y
Although the Tenth Circuit expressly refused to pass on the
constitutionality of non-malicious destruction of breathalyzer
ampoules, it .ruled that the summary treatment of the issue by
the state court denied defendant the right to a "full hearing." M
The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing with instruc-
tions that: (1) specific inquiry should be made into the particular
breathalyzer test given Edwards; (2) the pertinent statute per-
mitting immediate destruction should be submitted as evidence
UId. at 665.
The court noted that one grenade had been detonated almost immediatly following
Haro's sale to the agent and that it was a high quality destructive device, and that the
three exemplar grenades were identical in all pertinent respects. Id.
m Id. (citing United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1976)).
- 577 F.2d 1119 (10th Cir. 1978).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §§ 751-759.
U 577 F.2d at 1121.
1979
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accompanied by a detailed explanation of the ampoule itself; and
(3) most significantly, the government should offer an explana-
tion of the need for such destruction.
4. Petite Policy
211
In United States v. Thompson20 2 and United States L). Fritz"3
the Tenth Circuit addressed the Justice Department's so-called
"Petite Policy." As stated in the United States Attorney s Man-
ual, it is departmental policy that after a state prosecution there
should be no federal trial for the act or acts unless there are
compelling federal interests, in which case prior approval from
the Attorney General is to be obtained as a prerequisite to prose-
cution.24 Both cases held that: (1) the Petite policy is merely an
internal, self-regulatory departmental policy that creates no en-
forceable right in the defendant to avoid federal prosecution fol-
lowing a state conviction for the same acts; and (2) the United
States Attorney's failure to obtain prior approval from the Attor-
ney General had no effect on the validity of the prosecutions.
B. Admissibility of Evidence
1. Foundation
In this age of rapid technological advance, products which a
few years ago would have been considered novel in design have
become commonplace and the accuracy of such products is gener-
ally recognized. Given the orientation it was not surprising that
the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Foster215 took judicial notice
"' The Petite policy is a product of the tension created in a dual sovereign system
between the right to avoid double jeopardy and the ability of both state and federal courts
to prosecute a defendant for the same act. Under the policy, federal prosecution is disfa-
vored once the state has acted. But the existence of the doctrine does not expand a
defendant's rights. The Petite line of cases is interpreted to mean that promulgation of
the policy by the Department of Justice confers no rights on the defendant, and that a
defendant may not invoke the Petite policy to avoid federal prosecution unless the
government agrees. The doctrine takes its name from a factually inapposite situation,
however. Petite involved two federal prosecutions in different circuits. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's motion to vacate the second federal
judgment, indicating that policy dictated by fairness disfavors multiple prosecutions.
However, the essence of the doctrine is the federal policy of avoiding dual prosecutions
by the federal government when the state has already acted. Petite v. United States, 361
U.S. 529 (1960).
- 579 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1978).
263 580 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1978).
'1 Id. at 374.
580 F.2d 388 (1978).
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of the reliability and general acceptance of telephone company
equipment used to discover an unlawful device depriving it of
revenue.21 The majority ruled that the nature and extent of the
foundation which must be laid for introduction of tapes produced
by electronic equipment is largely discretionary, and that the
trial court's admission of the evidence was clearly within its au-
thority. The court then went beyond the trial court in taking
judicial notice of the accuracy of the phone company's detection
equipment.26 7
In United States v. Shields-5 the Tenth Circuit addressed the
admissibility of expert testimony on signature comparison when
none of the documents used for comparison were identified at
trial, admitted in evidence, or found by the trial court to contain
the genuine signature of the defendant. The court held the ex-
pert's testimony admissible under rule 703261 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence which provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data used need not be admissible in
evidence. "o
Moreover, the court noted that the defendant never challenged
the genuineness of the inadmissible document. He had merely
objected to the expert's testimony on the ground that the samples
were not originals.27
The court's application of rule 703 placed this defendant in
a dilemma. To challenge the authenticity of the comparative
documents he would have had to offer them into evidence,
Id. at 390. Defendant was using a multi-frequency signal generator "blue box" to
circumvent charges on long-distance phone calls. Alerted by the frequency and duration
of toll-free calls placed by defendant, the phone company had an employee monitor
defendant's phone with a detection device described as "Hekimian equipment." No at-
tempt was made to qualify the employee as an expert in the use of Hekimian equipment,
but the evidence was undisputed that the device used at trial functioned properly and
produced results identical to those produced by the equipment used on defendant's phone.
Id. at 389.
2" Id. at 390.
Ml 573 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1978).
N FED. R. Evm. 703.
211 573 F.2d at 21 (emphasis in court's opinion).
"' See FED. R. EVmD. 1002, the so-called Best Evidence Rule.
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thereby waiving his right to have such prejudicial evidence de-
clared inadmissible. Yet, by failing to challenge the documents,
the expert's testimony stood uncontradicted in the instant case.
2. Rule 404
In United States v. Carleo 2 the Tenth Circuit applied rule
404(b)2 3 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in upholding the trial
court's admission of evidence of uncharged crimes and acts as
proof of motive or intent. Defendant Carleo was a bar owner being
investigated for gambling and bookmaking activities. One of his
employees, Hull, discovered the operation and had been told to
keep quiet and leave town. Hull became a government informer,
and Carleo was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct a criminal
investigation 4 and obstruction of justice.2 7Both statutes require
proof of defendant's specific intent to obstruct. To satisfy this
element the prosecution offered evidence that defendant had
beaten another suspected informer in Hull's presence as an
"example" and had tried to intimidate Hull by references to a
well-known informer who had been shot the year before.Y'
The court ruled the government's evidence admissible under
rule 404(b).2 7 More significantly, it commended the manner in
which the trial court had handled the offer of proof and introduc-
tion of the evidence:
[The trial court here acted with the sensitivity and caution that
considerations of other crimes evidence requires [sic]. The court
called a recess in order carefully to consider the nature and purpose
of the proffered evidence outside the presence of the jury before it
was introduced. Moreover, the jury was instructed immediately
prior to the introduction of the testimony that it was "being re-
ceived for the very limited purpose of shedding what light it may,
if any, on the motive and intent of the defendant in the [jury's]
consideration of the charges made against him in this case." Rec-
ord, vol. 3, at 41. The court also cautioned the prosecution not to go
into the details of Dickinson's beating, and the government did not
" 576 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1978).
rn Fzre. R. Evm. 404(b) provides in pertinent part that: "Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts . . . may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity. intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident."
v, 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976).
' 576 F.2d at 849.
See note 273 supra.
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attempt to go beyond the scope of the inquiry delineated by the
court. " '
United States v. Westbo,2' concerned the introduction into
evidence of a separate, uncharged crime by way of cross-
examination. The evidence had been excluded from the govern-
ment's case-in-chief during an in camera conference. Westbo was
convicted of wire fraud;2 the fraud itself involved defendant's
breach of his fiduciary duty as broker for the Bankers Union Life
Insurance Company (BULIC). For financial reasons BULIC
needed to sell a block of mortgages within a short time. At the
last minute, Westbo's negotiations with the expected buyer fell
through so he agreed to purchase the mortgages himself for $2.4
million. He then sold the mortgages to another for $2.7 million.2'
During the course of the trial a BULIC committment letter,
allegedly forged by defendant, was discovered. The government
sought to introduce the letter under rule 404(b)2 2 to show that
defendant had consistently taken advantage of the hectic situa-
tion at BULIC in the months prior to the mortgage fraud. Be-
cause the court would not permit introduction of the letter as
substantive evidence, the government displayed the document
and cross-examined two witnesses about it without actually intro-
ducing it into evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction, ruling
that the trial court had abused its discretion in not declaring a
mistrial when the jury was exposed to this evidence. That conclu-
sion had two distinct aspects.m
First, in spite of the fact that the trial judge had excluded
that evidence, the government's manner of presentation elicited
the inference that defendant had forged the letter, although there
was absolutly no attempt to prove the forgery:
In effect, then, the forbidden evidence was put before the jury by
unavoidable inferences drawn from answers given by these prosecu-
tion witnesses. Compounding these prejucidial inferences was the
fact that defendant was then in the dilemma of having evidence of
576 F.2d at 849-50.
P 576 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1978).
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
576 F.2d at 288.
' See note 273 supra.
2 576 F.2d at 292.
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other crimes effectively before the jury but being unable to negate
these inferences without waiving his objection to this inadmissible
evidence.2"'
Second, the Tenth Circuit sought to interpret the trial
court's intent in excluding the letter as substantive evidence The
court concluded that the evidence had been properly excluded
under rule 4032 which provides for exclusion of any evidence in
which the probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice. The trial court's ruling was intended to
prohibit any reference to the letter; the government's "egregious
conduct" violated the clear intent of the court's ruling and denied
Westbo an opportunity to defend.
3. Rule 801(d)(2)
United States v. Blumenthal 6 illustrates the broad scope of
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).187 Blumenthal was originally
charged with distribution and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
The trial court dropped the conspiracy charge and defendant was
convicted of distribution. m As part of the premise for its holding
that there was sufficient independent proof of the existence of the
conspiracy to make the hearsay statements of the co-conspirators
admissible, the court noted in dictum that rule 801(d)(2)(E)
recognizes statements of co-conspirators as an exception to the
prohibition against hearsay even when no conspiracy is
chargedY'" As applied in Blumenthal, the dismissal of the con-
spiracy charge against defendant had no effect on the admissibil-
ity of extrajudicial statements by co-conspirators.
Admission of inculpatory statements by a co-conspirator was
m Id.
m FEa. R. Evm. 403.
m 575 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1978).
:8 FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is
(A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity
or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning
a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
575 F.2d at 1310. See note 287 supra for text of FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(E).
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a basis for appeal in United States v. Davis.,' In Davis, defen-
dant's co-conspirator was acquitted by the jury. Defendant
argued that the acquittal rendered her inculpatory statement ret-
roactively inadmissible. The court ruled that defendant's reliance
on the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Ratcliffe29 was
misplaced because a co-conspirator's statements are retroactively
inadmissible only if the declarant is acquitted as a matter of law,
and that the distinction between court and jury acquittal rests on
the requirements that admission of any co-conspirator's state-
ment requires an independent prima facie showing of declarant's
involvement in a conspiracy. When a declarant is acquitted as a
matter of law there is no such independent proof of the existence
of the conspiracy; therefore, the statements become inadmissible.
The intriguing aspect of Davis is the court's suggestion that
a timely request from defendant that the jury be instructed not
to consider the hearsay statement as evidence against Davis if
they found his co-conspirator not guilty might have been effec-
tive. " 2 Davis makes it apparent such an instruction would not
ordinarily come from the court sua sponte; the defense attorney
should request such an instruction whenever appropriate.
C. Interpretation of Federal Rules
1. FED. R. Cfnm. P. 12.1
In United States v. Fitts2 3 the Tenth Circuit refused to find
an abuse of discretion in the exclusion of defendant's alibi wit-
nesses under rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure,29' despite the fact that failure to comply with the g6vern-
ment's demand for a list of alibi witnesses under 12.1(a) n5 was the
578 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1978).
' 550 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1976). In Ratcliffe, the Ninth Circuit ruled that where
evidence is insufficient for submission to the jury and the court acquits an alleged co-
conspirator, prior out-of-court statements of the acquitted become inadmissible and a new
trial is required. Id, at 433.
Ut 578 F.2d at 281.
03 576 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1978).
M Fwn. R. CmiM. P. 12.1(d) provides in part: "Upon the failure of either party to
comply with requirements of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any undis-
closed witness offered by such party."
U FED. R. CaM. P. 12.1(a) provides in part:
Upon written demand of the attorney for the government. . . the defendant
shall serve . . . a written notice of his intention to offer a defense of alibi.
Such notice by the defendant shall state specific place or places at which the
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result of defense counsel's inexperience. Although the court indi-
cated that the 12.1(d) sanction probably should not have been
imposed under these rather extreme circumstances, such pro-
cedural elimination of Fitts' defense did not render the trial a
"mockery of justice."296
2. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20
In interpreting rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Herbst"7 adopted
the Singer rule 98 that the defendant may waive the right to be
tried in a particular district court, but may not compel transfer
of the case to another district.2"
Herbst was indicted in Kansas and in Wisconsin. The dis-
trict of Kansas moved to join all charges for a single Wisconsin
disposition pursuant to rule 20,20 but the proceeding was
dropped when the Wisconsin court refused the transfer. After he
was convicted in Wisconsin, defendant was tried in Kansas, con-
victed of interstate transportation of forged securities,30' and
given a sentence running consecutively with the Wisconsin term.
He argued that he had pled guilty in Wisconsin with the under-
standing that all outstanding charges against him were to be
combined, and that Wisconsin's refusal to include the Kansas
indictment and the subsequent abandonment of the proceeding
by Kansas without notice were violative of his due process rights.
The court held that absent a bargain in which the transferor
court had agreed to carry out a rule 20 transfer, the gravamen
of the rule was mutual consent by the district attorneys. Such a
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to
establish such alibi.
576 F.2d at 839.
565 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1978).
n Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), cited in United States v. Herbst, 565
F.2d at 642.
2" 565 F.2d at 642.
3n FeD. R. Clm. P. 20(a) provides in part:
A defendant arrested, held, or present in a district other than that in which
an indictment or information is pending against him may state in writing
that he wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive trial in the district
in which the indictment or information is pending, and to consent to disposi-
tion of the case in the district in which he was arrested, held, or present,
subject to the approval of the United States attorney for each district. ...
30 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
VoL.. 56
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
transfer was a matter of discretion rather than right, and failure
to notify the defendant of initiation or subsequent abandonment
of such proceeding was "not significant."
3. FED. R. CRM. P. 29
United States v. Lopezm included an interesting discussion
of the defendant's dilemma when his rule 29(b) motion for ac-
quittal has been denied.' If the defendant presents evidence
following the denial, his objection and ability to appeal the
denial are automatically waived and he assumes the risk that his
evidence will supply the missing elements of the prosecution's
case.
In Lopez, the Tenth Circuit noted recent criticisms of the
waiver rule3 and the opinion seems to suggest a willingness to
modify the rule. However, the court found the Lopez situation
factually inapposite and refused to confront the rule 29 question.
D. Statutory Interpretation
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1955
In United States v. Quarry- the court interpreted 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955, a federal gambling statute which requires participation by
at least five persons. At the close of the evidence the trial judge
gave an "all or nothing instruction" that all five defendants must
be found guilty to sustain any single guilty verdict. Because the
jury returned guilty verdicts against only four of the five defen-
dants, the judge acquitted all five. The government appealed the
judge's action,w maintaining that the trial judge had improperly
interpreted the five or more requirement of section 1955 and that
the section required only a showing that "five or more persons
conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed or own all or
part of such business."
* 565 F.2d at 643.
576 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1978).
Under rule 29, defendant automatically waives his objection to a denial of his
motion for acquittal if he thereafter presents testimony himself, although he may move
again at the close of all evidence. FED. R. CriM. P. 29.
M See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 869, 864 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 846 (1976); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 903 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
- 576 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1978).
i Cf. United States v. Calloway, 562 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1977) (discussing the govern-
ment's authority to appeal from the trial judge's error of law).
3 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1) (1976).
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The Tenth Circuit, agreeing with the government, ruled that
the trial judge's interpretation was inconsistent with both the
statute and the weight of authority A" The court reinstated the
jury's verdict of guilty as to the four defendants, ruling that al-
though the trial judge's instructions had been erroneous, the jury
had been provided with a copy of section 1955 and had correctly
interpreted it.
2. Jencks Act
In United States v. Heath ' the Tenth Circuit held that the
government had violated the Jencks Act,31" ' which requires that
the prosecution disclose statements of a government witness to
the defense. 2 On appeal the government asserted a good faith
defense based on the statutory language which compels produc-
tion only of statements "in possession" of the United States, ' "
and contended that the witheld statements were in state rather
than federal hands.
314
The Tenth Circuit refused to permit the government to adopt
this hypertechnical interpretation of "in possession," ruling that
any government witness' testimony is property subject to the




Conceding that the government had indeed violated the
Jencks Act by failing to produce the statement, the court noted
that the trial court had found no bad faith on the part of the
prosecutor, 3 1 and that the statements were eventually disclosed
1 576 F.2d at 833. See United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973).
310 580 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir. 1978). The Heath case involved six defendants convicted
of a conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 952 (1976). The
case was originally brought as a fourteen count indictment against twenty individuals
alleged to be members of a grand conspiracy. The case is an indicator of the potency of
the conspiracy charge and, according to the dissent, of the ability of the government to
wield the "sweeping net" of conspiracy to its advantage.
" 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976) is entitled "Demands for production of statements and
reports of witnesses."
3 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) provides in part: "After a witness called by the United States
has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the
United States to produce any statement . which relates to the subject matter as to
which the witness has testified."
1i3 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a).
31, 580 F.2d at 1018.
315 Id.
"I The dissent's analysis of the pattern of prosecutorial misconduct came to the
opposite conclusion; the pattern of requests, denials, and assurances transferred any gov-
ernment "inadvertance" into deliberate or at least negligent supression. Id. at 1030.
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with full opportunity for defendants to conduct a second cross-
examination. Even more significantly, the defense had not made
a motion to strike the testimony, nor did it affirmativly demon-
strate prejudice as a result of the violation. The court concluded
that no mistrial was required; defendant's conviction was upheld.
Judge McKay dissented, stating that the Act required the
court to strike the government witness' testimony"7 and to reverse
unless it was "perfectly clear" that the defense was not preju-
diced by the violation. Even when the government ultimately
produced the statements, the statute placed the burden on the
prosecution to make a clear showing that defendant was not prej-
udiced by the violation. t5
E. Post-trial Matters
1. Sentencing
The 1977-78 Tenth Circuit cases pertaining to sentencing
reaffirm the well-established rule that such matters are within
the sound discretion of the trial court. Watson v. United States'"
involved the resentencing procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 when
a prior sentence has been declared invalid because invalid convic-
tions were considered in assessing the sentence. Defendant Wat-
son was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a fifteen
year term. He initiated a section 2255 attack, contending that the
trial judge had considered a prior invalid conviction in setting the
term. The trial judge ruled that the first sentence was invalid, but
resentenced defendant to an identical term. On appeal, defen-
dant argued that he should have been resentenced by a new
judge, relying on a Ninth Circuit decision,32 which required fresh
", 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1976): "If the United States elects not to comply . ..the
court shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness . (Emphasis sup-
plied).
" 580 F.2d at 1029 (McKay, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Missler, 414
F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970)).
The requirements of the Jencks Act are intended to provide defendants in
federal prosecutions with an opportunity for thorough cross-examination of
government witnesses, making the constitutionally guaranteed right of con-
frontation more meaningful. Violations of the statute are necessarily at-
tended by the danger that this precious right will be impaired. For this
reason, and also because it is ordinarily difficult upon review of a cold record
to ascertain the value to the defense of a statement witheld, violation of the
Act is excused only in extraordinary circumstances.
' 575 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Farrow v. United States, No. 74-2429 (9th Cir., filed Sept. 24, 1976) (case reopened
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resentencing conducted by a new judge without consideration of
invalid prior convictions.
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's argument, holding
that the new sentence, even if identical, will be upheld if it ap-




The appeal in United States v. Thomas3 22 centered on what
the court termed a "misunderstanding" in a plea bargaining situ-
ation. Thomas was charged with possessing the contents of a
parcel stolen from the United States mails. 32 Defendant pled
guilty on the basis of a promise that the judge would not impose
the sentence until all charges were accumulated. He was sen-
tenced by a different judge however, and two days after sen-
tencing, defendant was indicted on numerous other charges. 32'
Thomas moved to dismiss the newly returned indictment on the
ground that the government had reneged on representations pre-
viously made which defendant had relied on to his detriment.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's dismissal, and
remanded the case for trial. In its view, the trial judge's bargain
in no way constituted an agreement by the government that fur-
ther indictments would not be returned. Rather, the "promise"
was construed simply as an agreement that defendant would not
be sentenced until all existing indictments had been returned. 32
Moreover, the court of appeals indicated that the subsequent
indictments were not filed in bad faith. Therefore, the court sug-
gested two alternatives to be pursued on remand: (1) that defen-
dant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to the original charge;
or (2) that defendant's sentence be vacated without a withdrawal
of the guilty plea and the new indictments be processed before
imposing a sentence.32
Apr. 14, 1977 to be considered by the court en banc).
n 575 F.2d at 810.Arcord, United States v. Radowitz, 507 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1974);
United States v. Gaither, 503 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1974).
m 580 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1978).
m 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1970).
' The new indictment included violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 495, 1708, 2314, and 371.
580 F.2d at 1037.
580 F.2d at 1038.
mId.
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Barker v. United States'" also involved plea bargaining, spe-
cifically a defendant's right to withdraw his plea of guilty prior
to sentencing. Barker was convicted of receipt by a previously
convicted felon of a firearm transported in interstate commerce.so2
While awaiting trial his apartment was searched and several in-
criminating items-a sawed-off shotgun and some marijuana-
were seized. After a full hearing pursuant to rule 11(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Barker pled guilty, and
the government agreed not to oppose defendant's release
bond until sentencing and not to attempt to make use of any
evidence found in the apartment. Further, Barker was found to
be mentally competent and represented by adequate counsel dur-
ing the entire proceeding, and his guilty plea was deemed free and
voluntary. 2 ' One week before sentencing however, Barker at-
tempted to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that he had been
coerced into the bargain. The trial court ruled that the coercion
argument was without merit.m"
On appeal Barker distinguished between pleas withdrawn
before and after sentencing, urging that the proper test before
sentencing was "fairness and justice. " 11 Defendant argued that
the trial court improperly employed the more stringent post-
sentencing standard .
2
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the trial court's use of the words
"mandate" and "require"'s did not indicate application of the
improper standard. Such terms only expressed the court's recog-
nition that withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an absolute right,
but rather one resting solidly in the discretion of the trial court.m
579 F.2a 1219 (10th Cir. 1978).
I 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1976).
- The pleas were held to be in full compliance with FeD. R. CanM. P. 11(d). 579 F.2d
at 1224.
Id. at 1222.
I' d. at 1223.
- The more stringent test after sentencing, withdrawal of a guilty plea only in cases
of manifest injustice, is found in FRn. R. Cwm. P. 32(d).
s Barker based his argument on the language in the trial court's memorandum
denying his withdrawal motion: "We are not convinced that he would have presented legal
ground sufficient to mandate allowance of his motion for withdrawal. . . .There is no
situation here which would require us to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea." (Emphasis
in opinion). 579 F.2d at 1223.
sm579 F.2d at 1223.
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Therefore, the trial court's refusal to allow defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea was not error.
Kay Graves Thomas
Karen A. Perez
David W. Miller
Amy T. Loper
